The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-32726-1_17zbMath1528.91040arXiv2211.01907OpenAlexW4377200030MaRDI QIDQ6086004

Max Klimm, Unnamed Author, Michael Joswig

Publication date: 9 November 2023

Published in: Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.01907

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special polytopes (linear programming, centrally symmetric, etc.) (52B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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