Trade of a common value good

DOI10.1007/s10058-022-00322-6zbMath1530.91360OpenAlexW4308897568MaRDI QIDQ6086121

Steven R. Williams

Publication date: 12 December 2023

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00322-6

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionincentive compatibilitycommon valueex post

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Trade models (91B60)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition

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