Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects
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Publication:6086124
DOI10.1007/s10058-022-00320-8zbMath1530.91209OpenAlexW4308792765MaRDI QIDQ6086124
Publication date: 12 December 2023
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00320-8
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