MORAL HAZARD IN REMOTE TEAMS

DOI10.1111/IERE.12579zbMath1530.91051OpenAlexW4226510513MaRDI QIDQ6088640

Ariel Zetlin-Jones, Unnamed Author, Emilio Bisetti

Publication date: 16 November 2023

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12579

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
• Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME

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