DECIDING WHEN TO DECIDE: COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION AND OBSTRUCTION

DOI10.1111/iere.12614zbMath1530.91136MaRDI QIDQ6088667

Vincent Anesi, Mikhail Safronov

Publication date: 16 November 2023

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Cites Work

• Endogenous voting agendas
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
• Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation
• Thinking Ahead: The Decision Problem
• Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
• Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
• Deliberating Collective Decisions
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions

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