BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH

DOI10.1111/iere.12625zbMath1530.91396OpenAlexW4313524454MaRDI QIDQ6088676

Marina Azzimonti, Unnamed Author, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 16 November 2023

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12625

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

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