REDUCING RECOMMENDATION INEQUALITY VIA TWO‐SIDED MATCHING: A FIELD EXPERIMENT OF ONLINE DATING

DOI10.1111/IERE.12631zbMath1530.91431OpenAlexW4321099925MaRDI QIDQ6088692

Yu-Wei Hsieh, Unnamed Author, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 16 November 2023

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12631

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Cites Work

• Computational Optimal Transport: With Applications to Data Science
• Unique equilibria and substitution effects in a stochastic model of the marriage market
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Identification in matching games
• Two-Sided Estimation of Mate Preferences for Similarities in Age, Education, and Religion
• Cupid’s Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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