Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers

DOI10.3982/QE1781OpenAlexW4285286536MaRDI QIDQ6088783

Pasha Andreyanov, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 16 November 2023

Published in: Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/qe1781

zbMATH Keywords

unobserved heterogeneityfirst-price auctionreserve pricetimber industry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Related Items (1)

Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Information acquisition and/or bid preparation: a structural analysis of entry and bidding in timber sale auctions
• Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
• Nonparametric estimation of the measurement error model using multiple indicators.
• Nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders
• Open outcry auctions with secret reserve prices: An empirical application to executive auctions of tenant owner's apartments in Sweden
• Bidding off the wall: Why reserve prices may be kept secret
• Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
• Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance
• Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity
• On some characterization of probability distributions in Hilbert spaces
• Identification and Estimation of Auction Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity
• Optimal Auction Design
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
• Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
• The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions
• Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions
• Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers

This page was built for publication: Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers