Expertise, gender, and equilibrium play

DOI10.3982/qe1563OpenAlexW4384571285MaRDI QIDQ6088828

Lionel Page, John Wooders, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 16 November 2023

Published in: Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/qe1563

zbMATH Keywords

minimaxnatural experimentmixed strategy Nash equilibrium play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Related Items (1)

Expertise, gender, and equilibrium play

Cites Work

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• Testing Statistical Hypotheses
• EXTENSION OF THE NEYMAN-PEARSON THEORY OF TESTS TO DISCONTINUOUS VARIATES
• Expertise, gender, and equilibrium play

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