A mechanism that provides incentives for truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems

DOI10.1007/S10660-010-9059-8zbMath1207.68091OpenAlexW1983511185MaRDI QIDQ608998

George D. Stamoulis, Thanasis G. Papaioannou

Publication date: 30 November 2010

Published in: Electronic Commerce Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/142596

zbMATH Keywords

credibilityMarkov modelsteady statecollusionrational adversariesstrategy proofSybil attack

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Internet topics (68M11)

Related Items (1)

A mechanism that provides incentives for truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems

Cites Work

• A mechanism that provides incentives for truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems
• Web-based reputation management systems: Problems and suggested solutions
• Reputation-based policies that provide the right incentives in peer-to-peer environments
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