Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
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Publication:6090447
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105712zbMath1530.91253arXiv2010.16384OpenAlexW3123565303MaRDI QIDQ6090447
Priyanka Shende, Manish Purohit
Publication date: 17 November 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.16384
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