A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105713zbMath1530.91053arXiv2005.13921OpenAlexW3030246531MaRDI QIDQ6090449

Jakob Grue Simonsen, Jakub Dargaj

Publication date: 17 November 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.13921

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescomputabilitysubgame-perfect equilibriabest response strategieslimit-of-means payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• The myth of the folk theorem
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• The complexity of computing best-response automata in repeated games
• Indexings of subrecursive classes
• The complexity of computing a best response automaton in repeated games with mixed strategies
• Non-computability of competitive equilibrium
• Computable strategies for repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Two-person repeated games with finite automata
• Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames
• Optimal output-sensitive convex hull algorithms in two and three dimensions
• Non-computable strategies and discounted repeated games
• Optimality and domination in repeated games with bounded players
• Undecidability and recursive inseparability
• Essentials of Game Theory: A Concise Multidisciplinary Introduction
• Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
• The truth behind the myth of the folk theorem
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