Signaling, screening, and core stability
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Publication:6090450
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105715zbMath1530.91127OpenAlexW4385507199MaRDI QIDQ6090450
Roberto Serrano, Yusuke Kamishiro, Rajiv Vohra
Publication date: 17 November 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105715
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Cites Work
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