Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105722zbMath1530.91307OpenAlexW4386376580MaRDI QIDQ6090454

Chen Lyu

Publication date: 17 November 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105722

zbMATH Keywords

competitionBayesian persuasionconsumer searchinformation designsearch goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

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• Information revelation in competitive markets
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
• Consumer Search and Price Competition
• Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
• The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
• Censorship as optimal persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition

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