The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105731zbMath1530.91052OpenAlexW4386496054MaRDI QIDQ6090456

Krittanai Laohakunakorn, Guilherme Carmona

Publication date: 17 November 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105731

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescooperationprisoner's dilemmafolk theoreminformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions
• Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players

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