On sustainable equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105736zbMath1530.91029arXiv2005.14094MaRDI QIDQ6090462

Lucas Pahl, Srihari Govindan, Rida Laraki

Publication date: 17 November 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14094

zbMATH Keywords

sustainable equilibriaindex of equilibriarefinements of equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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