Behavioral implementation under incomplete information

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105738zbMath1530.91082OpenAlexW2887692232MaRDI QIDQ6090463

Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, Mehmet Barlo

Publication date: 17 November 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105738

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationbehavioral implementationbehavioral interim incentive efficiencyinterim implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

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• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• The Theory of Statistical Decision
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
• Behavioral strong implementation
• Computational implementation

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