Competition in costly talk
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Publication:6090464
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105740arXiv2103.05317OpenAlexW4386898731MaRDI QIDQ6090464
Publication date: 17 November 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.05317
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