Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105741zbMath1530.91239OpenAlexW4386865414MaRDI QIDQ6090465

Ethem Akyol

Publication date: 17 November 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105741

zbMATH Keywords

random serial dictatorshipallocation without transfersBayesian incentive compatibilityrandom Boston mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
• Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
• Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets
• The Average Number of Stable Matchings
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
• An Exact Analysis of Stable Allocation
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

This page was built for publication: Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information