Stable outcomes and information in games: an empirical framework
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Publication:6090549
DOI10.1016/J.JECONOM.2023.105499arXiv2205.04990MaRDI QIDQ6090549
Publication date: 17 November 2023
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.04990
partial identificationinformational robustnessBayes stable equilibriumburger industryestimation of games
Statistics (62-XX) Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)
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