A game‐theoretic approach for the location of terror response facilities with both disruption risk and hidden information
DOI10.1111/itor.12900OpenAlexW3094654958MaRDI QIDQ6091866
Ming-Chu Li, Cheng Guo, Qing Li, Unnamed Author
Publication date: 21 November 2023
Published in: International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12900
facility locationbi-level programmingvariable depth neighborhood searcha leader-follower gameinformation hidden
Mixed integer programming (90C11) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)
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