“Production + procurement” outsourcing with competitive contract manufacturer's partial learning and supplier's price discrimination
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Publication:6091869
DOI10.1111/ITOR.12904OpenAlexW3105144696MaRDI QIDQ6091869
Unnamed Author, Baozhuang Niu, Lei Chen
Publication date: 21 November 2023
Published in: International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12904
Related Items (4)
Flexible versus committed and specific versus uniform: wholesale price contracting in a supply chain with downstream process innovation ⋮ One step further for procurement cooperation: will the industry leader benefit from its competitive manufacturer's joint determination of consumption quality? ⋮ The impact of production diseconomies on manufacturer encroachment ⋮ Sourcing strategies of manufacturers with customer returns and product design efforts
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