Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness
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Publication:6093638
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111127zbMath1521.91098MaRDI QIDQ6093638
M. Remzi Sanver, Ali Ihsan Ozkes
Publication date: 12 September 2023
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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