On weakly and strongly popular rankings

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2023.06.041zbMath1521.91088arXiv2102.01361OpenAlexW3169474491MaRDI QIDQ6094721

Ágnes Cseh, Sonja Kraiczy, David F. Manlove

Publication date: 14 September 2023

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.01361

zbMATH Keywords

complexitymajority rulepreference aggregationpopular matchingKemeny consensus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Accurate algorithms for identifying the median ranking when dealing with weak and partial rankings under the Kemeny axiomatic approach
• The complexity of Kemeny elections
• Popular matchings in the weighted capacitated house allocation problem
• On the complexity of crossings in permutations
• Fixed-parameter algorithms for Kemeny rankings
• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
• Ternary voting games
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection
• Median of 3 Permutations, 3-Cycles and 3-Hitting Set problem
• Popular branchings and their dual certificates
• \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters
• Popular ranking
• Judge: Don't Vote!
• Topological sorting of large networks
• Popular Matchings
• Reducibility among Combinatorial Problems
• Popular Matching in Roommates Setting Is NP-hard
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
• Popular Matchings and Limits to Tractability
• Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
• POPULAR SPANNING TREES
• A NEW MEASURE OF RANK CORRELATION
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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