Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret
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Publication:6096182
DOI10.1080/03610926.2022.2042023OpenAlexW4214842925MaRDI QIDQ6096182
Stephen Joe, Muhammad Ejaz, Chaitanya K. Joshi
Publication date: 11 September 2023
Published in: Communications in Statistics - Theory and Methods (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/03610926.2022.2042023
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Cites Work
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