An evolutionary game with revengers and sufferers on complex networks

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2023.128168MaRDI QIDQ6096267

Yuji Zhang, Bin Pi, Minyu Feng, Ziyan Zeng

Publication date: 11 September 2023

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary gamenetwork sciencerevenge and suffer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx) Graph theory (05Cxx)

Cites Work

• Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: experimental evidence
• Promoting cooperation by punishing minority
• A synergy of punishment and extortion in cooperation dilemmas driven by the leader
• Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable
• Conditional neutral punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Social exclusion with dynamic cost on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Investigating the co-evolution of node reputation and edge-strategy in prisoner's dilemma game
• The spatial inheritance enhances cooperation in weak prisoner's dilemmas with agents' exponential lifespan
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• A theory of group selection.
• Evolving networks based on birth and death process regarding the scale stationarity
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• The accumulative law and its probability model: an extension of the Pareto distribution and the log-normal distribution
• Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks

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