The dynamics of corruption under an optional external supervision service
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Publication:6096272
DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2023.128172OpenAlexW4381853151MaRDI QIDQ6096272
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Publication date: 11 September 2023
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2023.128172
Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91Dxx)
Cites Work
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