Restoring spatial cooperation with myopic agents in a three-strategy social dilemma
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Publication:6096358
DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2023.128226arXiv2307.02832OpenAlexW4383497588MaRDI QIDQ6096358
Hsuan-Wei Lee, Colin Cleveland, Attila Szolnoki
Publication date: 12 September 2023
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.02832
Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91Dxx)
Cites Work
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- Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
- Combined effect of pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
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