Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6098859
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2023.103855MaRDI QIDQ6098859
Makoto Yokoo, Kwei-guu Liu, Kentaro Yahiro
Publication date: 19 June 2023
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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