An Axiomatic Model of Persuasion

DOI10.3982/ECTA16729zbMATH Open1514.91029OpenAlexW3201586842MaRDI QIDQ6100249

[[Person:6100248|Author name not available (Why is that?)]]

Publication date: 12 May 2023

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16729

zbMATH Keywords

value of informationcommitmentdynamic inconsistencyBayesian persuasionpreference for information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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