Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
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Publication:6100484
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102831zbMath1519.91079OpenAlexW3085286943MaRDI QIDQ6100484
Shunya Noda, Hitoshi Matsushima
Publication date: 22 June 2023
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102831
Cites Work
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