Commitment and partial naïveté: early withdrawal penalties on retirement accounts

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2023.102844zbMath1519.91227OpenAlexW4365452710MaRDI QIDQ6100489

Pan Liu, Joydeep Bhattacharya, Torben M. Andersen

Publication date: 22 June 2023

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102844

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentpartial naïvetépresent-biasretirement accounts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Portfolio theory (91G10)

Cites Work

• On myopia as rationale for social security
• Procrastination, self-imposed deadlines and other commitment devices
• Present-bias, procrastination and deadlines in a field experiment
• Choice and Procrastination
• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
• Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
• Commitment contracts*
• A theory of personal budgeting
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
• Commitment vs. Flexibility

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