More licensed technologies may make it worse: a welfare analysis of licensing vertically two-tier foreign technologies

DOI10.1007/s00712-023-00818-xzbMath1518.91105MaRDI QIDQ6100985

Yan-Shu Lin, Jin-Li Hu, Hong Hwang, Ku-Chu Tsao

Publication date: 20 June 2023

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

welfarelicensingtwo-part tariffvertically-related marketstwo tiers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) PDEs in connection with game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences (35Q91) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (1)

International licensing under an endogenous tariff in vertically-related markets

Cites Work

• Technology licensing, R\&D and welfare
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
• Technology licensing under product differentiation
• On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival
• Cross ownership and divestment incentives

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