The logit dynamic in supermodular games with a continuum of strategies: a deterministic approximation approach
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Publication:6102515
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.003zbMath1519.91039MaRDI QIDQ6102515
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Publication date: 23 June 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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