Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6102569
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.009zbMath1519.91132OpenAlexW3204020545MaRDI QIDQ6102569
Publication date: 23 June 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.009
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
- Sad-loser contests
- Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
- Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction
- Manipulations in contests
- Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
- Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in tullock contests
- Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices
- Contests with insurance
- Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction
- Optimal taxation in a common resource oligopoly game
- Contests with endogenous entry
- Biased contests for symmetric players
- Contest architecture
- Optimal Auction Design
- Large Contests
- On the optimal design of biased contests
This page was built for publication: Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information
