Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.011zbMath1519.91137OpenAlexW3135425534MaRDI QIDQ6102578

Shigehiro Serizawa, Yu Zhou

Publication date: 23 June 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.011

zbMATH Keywords

examplesmulti-object auctionquasi-linearityminimum price equilibriumthe coincidence assumption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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