Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility

DOI10.1007/s10479-022-05111-6zbMath1519.91121arXiv2109.05456OpenAlexW3199617634MaRDI QIDQ6103197

Ata Atay, Eric Bahel, Tamás Solymosi

Publication date: 26 June 2023

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.05456

zbMATH Keywords

corecompetitive equilibriummatching marketsmiddlemenassignment gamesmatchmakers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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