Assortative matching by lottery contests
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Publication:6105133
DOI10.3390/g13050064zbMath1519.91176OpenAlexW4297988591MaRDI QIDQ6105133
Aner Sela, Ishay Rabi, Chen Cohen
Publication date: 26 June 2023
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13050064
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