Assortative matching by lottery contests

DOI10.3390/g13050064zbMath1519.91176OpenAlexW4297988591MaRDI QIDQ6105133

Aner Sela, Ishay Rabi, Chen Cohen

Publication date: 26 June 2023

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13050064

zbMATH Keywords

two-sided matchingTullock contest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
• Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs
• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results
• The nature of tournaments
• The optimal multi-stage contest
• Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• Contest success functions: an extension
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in tullock contests
• Foundations for contest success functions
• The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments
• ``Reverse nested lottery contests
• Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs
• The pre-marital investment game
• Contest architecture
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• All-Pay Contests
• Efficient and Competitive Rationing
• To Each According to . . . ? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints

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