Groundwater usage and strategic complements. I. (Instrumental Variables)

DOI10.3390/g13050067zbMath1519.91185MaRDI QIDQ6105137

Unnamed Author, Caleb M. Koch

Publication date: 26 June 2023

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

identificationpanel datagroundwaterdynamic game theorycommon-pool resourcesUS agriculture

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)

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