The strategy method risks conflating confusion with a social preference for conditional cooperation in public goods games

DOI10.3390/G13060069zbMath1519.91065OpenAlexW4307555662MaRDI QIDQ6105142

Victoire D'Amico, Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew, Claire Guérin

Publication date: 26 June 2023

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060069

zbMATH Keywords

learningconditional cooperationaltruismsocial preferencesirrationalconfusionhomo economicus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90) Social learning (91D15)

Related Items (1)

The black box as a control for payoff-based learning in economic games

Cites Work

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• Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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