Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences

DOI10.3390/g13060075zbMath1519.91139MaRDI QIDQ6105150

Hiroki Shinozaki

Publication date: 26 June 2023

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencystrategy-proofnessmulti-object auctionsnon-quasi-linear preferencesegalitarian-equivalenceindependent second-prices ruleindependent second-prices rule with variable constraintssecond-price rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
• Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
• Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
• On the nonexistence of envy-free and egalitarian-equivalent allocations in economies with indivisibilities
• Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
• Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
• Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
• Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
• Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
• No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
• Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

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