The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting

DOI10.3390/G13060077zbMath1519.91096OpenAlexW4309289699MaRDI QIDQ6105152

Marina Bannikova, José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez

Publication date: 26 June 2023

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060077

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumsequential votingalternate orderingfixed ordering

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• An experimental study of voting with costly delay
• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
• Multiperson bargaining over two alternatives
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
• Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
• Multilateral Bargaining

This page was built for publication: The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting