Cyber deterrence with imperfect attribution and unverifiable signaling

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.021MaRDI QIDQ6106792

Justin Grana, Jonathan W. Welburn, Karen Schwindt

Publication date: 3 July 2023

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game theorysecuritydecision analysis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

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Cites Work

• False targets efficiency in defense strategy
• Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game
• Revenge or continued attack and defense in defender-attacker conflicts
• Attacker-defender model against quantal response adversaries for cyber security in logistics management: an introductory study
• Optimal policies for information sharing in information system security
• Cybersecurity investments in the supply chain: coordination and a strategic attacker
• Attacking and defending multiple valuable secrets in a big data world

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