Strategic investment decisions in an oligopoly with a competitive fringe: an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints approach
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Publication:6106796
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.034WikidataQ114670138 ScholiaQ114670138MaRDI QIDQ6106796
Mel T. Devine, Sauleh Ahmad Siddiqui
Publication date: 3 July 2023
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
OR in energyequilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC)investment and generation decisionsoligopoly with a competitive fringe
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