Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities

DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01410-4zbMath1520.91195OpenAlexW4205658996MaRDI QIDQ6107363

Akira Okada

Publication date: 3 July 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01410-4

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyNash bargaining solutionCoase theoremparticipationexternalityside-payment contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games
• Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
• Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

This page was built for publication: Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities