The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation
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Publication:6107382
DOI10.1007/s00199-022-01426-4zbMath1520.91130OpenAlexW4223652220MaRDI QIDQ6107382
José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto, Ben Chen
Publication date: 3 July 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01426-4
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