Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers

DOI10.1007/S00199-022-01442-4zbMath1520.91191MaRDI QIDQ6107392

Mingshi Kang, Charles Z. Zheng

Publication date: 3 July 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

redistributionmarket designrationingironinginterim incentive efficiencyvaccine distributionendogenous buyers and sellersinterim Pareto optimality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility
• A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
• Redistribution Through Markets
• Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships
• Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders

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