Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition

DOI10.1007/s00199-022-01443-3zbMath1525.91115OpenAlexW3000743101MaRDI QIDQ6107393

Hervé Crès, Mich Tvede

Publication date: 3 July 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/86777/1/Cournot.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingPareto optimalityWalrasian equilibriaCournot-Walras equilibriumshareholder governancestakeholder democracy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

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• The objective of a privately owned firm under imperfect competition
• Cournot-Walras and locally consistent equilibria
• On the finiteness of the number of critical equilibria, with an application to random selections
• An equilibrium existence theorem for a general model without ordered preferences
• The price normalization problem in imperfect competition and the objective of the firm
• Multiplicity of equilibria
• Invariance of the equilibrium set of games with an endogenous sharing rule
• The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm
• Profit maximization mitigates competition
• Indeterminacy of Cournot-Walras equilibrium with incomplete markets
• Production externalities: internalization by voting
• Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets
• Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
• On 64%-Majority Rule
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem

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