Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts
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Publication:6108295
DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2022.10.003MaRDI QIDQ6108295
Laurent Lamy, Manasa Patnam, Michael Visser
Publication date: 29 June 2023
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
endogenous matchingeconometrics of auctionseconometrics of contractspolychotomous sample selectionprice-performance elasticity
Statistics (62-XX) Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)
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