Decentralized update selection with semi-strategic experts

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_23zbMath1524.68020arXiv2205.08407OpenAlexW4297821675MaRDI QIDQ6109537

Philip Lazos, Georgios Birmpas, Georgios Amanatidis, Francisco J. Marmolejo-Cossío

Publication date: 28 July 2023

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.08407

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Distributed systems (68M14) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)

Related Items (1)

Decentralized update selection with semi-strategic experts

Cites Work

• Handbook on approval voting
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• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• A Strategic Analysis of Nonranked Voting Systems
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation
• Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations
• Decentralized update selection with semi-strategic experts

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