Decentralized update selection with semi-strategic experts
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Publication:6109537
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_23zbMath1524.68020arXiv2205.08407OpenAlexW4297821675MaRDI QIDQ6109537
Philip Lazos, Georgios Birmpas, Georgios Amanatidis, Francisco J. Marmolejo-Cossío
Publication date: 28 July 2023
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.08407
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Cites Work
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- Decentralized update selection with semi-strategic experts
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